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1. Introduction: Regime and Societal Terrorism
The problem addressed here concems whether and under what circumstances
the use of terroristic violence by a state may become self-reproducing. First we will
examine a specific set of cases from Central America, where a comparison helps
clarify where terrorism has been reproduced and where it hardly occurs. Then
arguments will be put forward that such state terrorism has occurred because of two
major conditions. It was initiated by the act of conquest that introduced terrorism into
a relationship between newly created ethnicities, the indigenous peoples, and Iberian
conquerors. The terrorism is reproduced by the interaction of a conquest-produced,
and ethnically divided society on the one hand, and an ethnocratic regime on the other.
The important distinction being made here is between state terrorism as a
product of a regime (in this case the ethnocratic ladino governing elites of Guatemala)
and as a product of intrasocietal relationships (here, that between the ruling ladino
ethnicity, and the subordinated and equally large indigenous Mayan population). Both
social organizations can potentially trigger terrorism; but when they exist within a
single society, each can trigger the other.
2. The Central American Case
A. Mesoamerican Terrorism
In Central America, a tradition of state terrorism is to be found in El Salvador
and Guatemala. It has been manifest in the relationship that has held between the state,
currently dominated by an alliance of strong military establishment and agrarian
oligarchic interests, and the indigenes and rural country people. It has been manifest
in recent years by slaughters of thousands, principally of Indians. While much of this
history is yet to be extracted from the records, the slaughter has been a calculated
response by the state to what is perceived to be a tbreat of violence by the indigenes.
This accounted for some 20,000 deaths in El Salvador in 1932, plus random aerial
bombings and town slaughters during the present civil war. In Guatemala, slaughter
of large numbers of Indians has been periodic since the institution of the great
"Reform" of the 1870s. In recent years such events can be cited for deaths in the
hundreds in specific cases in 1944 and 1978, and thena sweep of perhaps fifty to
sixty thousand from 1979 to 1984. In the recent era the victims were generally
accused of being party to cornmunist conspiracies.
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In contrast, indigenous rebellions in Panama in 1925 and in Nicaragua in the
1980s did not lead to any such slaughter. In Panama, the killing of some twenty-five
individual s, including all the local police, by the Kuna Indians 100not to a slaughter of
the Kuna, but to a negotiated settlement of the indigenes' concerns, and the
establishment of the Comarca de San BIas, a reservation area where the indigenes have
internal political autonomy.
In contrast with the Guatemalan slaughter of indigenes inI979-1984, during
the same period the Nicaraguan revolutionary government was severely challengOOby
some of the leadership of the Miskito indigenous population of the Atlantic coast.
Some 20,000, perhaps as much as a quarter of the total Nicaraguan Miskito peoples,
flOOto Honduras, and many of the men formOOguerrilla groups to fight along with the
"Contra" force s being suppliOOby the Unitoo States. In spite of these overt militant
activities, the Nicaraguan govemment did not resort to terroristic reprisals on the
Miskito.l
B. The Historical Reason2
In looking for the historical reasons behind these differences, we begin prior 10
the Spanish conquest, when the indigenous societies of Central America varied in
complexity, with more complex kingdoms, deriving from Mexican influences,
occupying Mesoamerica, and less complex chiefdoms occupying the region to the east
and south and most of the Atlantic coast east of Belize. These two regions-
Mesoamerica to the northwest, and lower Central American to the southeast-reflectOO
different histories, as the languages of the southeastem groups are generally relatOO10
others in South America, whereas those of Mesoamerica found their relationships to
the north.
The importance of this difference at the time of the conquest, however, lay in
the fact that the more complex Mesoamerica had hamessOOits population into a labor
force accustomOO to working for their kings' own great projects, building political
centers such as Utatlán, Iximché, Zaculeu in the Guatemalan highlands, and others in
El Salvador. The Spanish thus found the Mesoamerican peoples easier to control in a
labor force than were those of the chiefdoms of the southeast.
The Spanish conquered these two regions in different ways. Most of
Mesoamerica was either vanquishOO by a single conqueror, Pedro de Alvarado, and
placOOrapidIy under a labor system, or was left for a slower conquest by the church at
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a later date, accomplishing the same thing. The southeast, in contrasto was conquered
by various conquistadores who promptly enslaved most surviving indigenes.3
The differences between the two kinds of conquests led to different
depopulation histories. While the entire area was heavily damaged by disease--even
before the actual arrival of the conquest parties-the southeast was then depopulated
by intensive and rapid enslavement of the Indians, leaving the region almost bereft of
potentiallabor. In contrast, while there was some enslaving of Indians by the
followers of Alvarado, Mesoamerica was by no means depopulated.
The overall consequence was a major differential in the number of Indians that
were able to survive by 1550. Table 1 provides a summary of the contrasts. In
comparison with lower Central America, Mesoamerica shows a significantIy higher
aboriginal survival, both relative to original population and in absolute number. In
comparison with both Mesoamerica and the southeast, the Atlantic coast peoples, who
were never conquered at all, show the greatest survival rateo The Spanish found this
region unrewarding and previously uncontrolled, and never brought it under
continuing control. Hence, after the initial population disasters, the surviving Indians
in the Atlantic region of Central America were not seriously threatened
demographically.
Out of the differences in pre-Columbian society, coupled with the different
direct effects of the conquest, the southeast and Atlantic coast regions of Central
America tended to evolve along lines quite different from those of Mesoamerica. The
major difference was that where significant Indian populations survived, mainly in
Nicaragua and Panama, they were not conquered, and hence were never brought into
forced labor.
The Spanish society that grew up in Mesoamerica, in southeastem Guatemala
and neighboring El Salvador, depended on the labor of both black slaves and Indians.
As the conquerors reminded the Indians and slaves from time to time that they were
coerced, aclimate of fear persisted throughout the era. With independence, and the
emergence of the liberal demand for export-oriented development, the hamessing of
labor became even more intense and the institution of forced labor served to re-create
this climate of fear in every subsequent generation.4 Periodic revolts against the
abuses and unfair, often inhuman, control practices were met with harsh punishment,
and slaughters oflndians were acceptable means of contro1.5
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C. Tbe Roots of Fear
The roots of tbis fear lie in the fact that the failure to extenninate or assimilate a
conquered people inevitably leaves a population with divided identities. The Spanish
arrived in Mesoamerica under the assumption that hegemony over the peoples of the
region had already been granted them by the papal bull of Alexander VI that divided
the region (370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands) between Spain and Portugal
in 1493. Victoria Bricker has argued that this established a "myth of pacification. "6
The Spanish assumed that all aboriginals were already subordinate to the hegemony of
the Spanish crown and should obey and be treated as conquered peoples. Aboriginal
resistance was therefore seen not as an understandable reluctance to be conquered, but
rather as rank treason against the already duly constituted authority, against the
crown's preordained hegemony.7 The indigenous population hardly shared this view.
The following centuries saw not only open revolts, but a strong, continuing sense of
native autonomy. In many Guatemalan Indian cornmunities today, the Dance of the
Conquest, and that of the Moors and the Christian s, as well as countless customs not
readily evident to outsiders, keep alive the Indians' rejection of the conquest 8
The indigenes learned genuinely to fear the Spanish propensity and ability to
use force and terror, and independence in the early nineteenth century brought no
break in this. However, fear was not lodged with them alone. The Spanish, and the
ladinos of postindependence Guatemala and El Salvador, were deeply apprehensive
about native revolts. This anxiety was not unique to the New World, but replicated the
urbanite's fear of peasant rebellions that is probably as old as civilization itself. In the
Mesoamerican part of Central America, however, this fear danced in a dialectic with
the Indian cultural memory. Thus, over subsequent centuries, the emerging ladino
population feared the Indians as a potentially rebellious people who periodically had to
be reminded of their conquered status; and the periodic reminders, quite naturally,
regularly reinforced the Indians' fear of the Spanish-Iater ladino--political and
economic dominance.
This is the core of the "Conquest Tradition." It involves a relationship in
which both ethnicities harbor deep fears of the other's potential for violence and terror.
The Indians deeply resent centuries of economic and political suppression and
injustices, and strongly retain the myth that the state of conquest is not final. The
ladinos fear.the Indians because they are deeply dependent on them for their well-
being, and the failure of the latter to produce some semblance of peaceful order is a
6
major threat to their political and economic security. Finally, both indigenes and
ladinos have kept alive a wide range of descriptive ideas and projects about the ethnic
qualities of the other. The "Conquest Tradition" is played out through a dialectic of
performances that reproduce all of this, generation after generation.
3. The State and the Reproduction of Violence
A. Fear of Violence Is Fundamental to the State
In our concem for the abuses by the state in resorting to terrorism, it must not
be forgotten that the state is an institution that is founded on violence; indeed, one
might characterize the state as an institution that seeks to guarantee peace and harmony
through the threat of violence. At its base, state govemance rests on some degree of
fear and apprehension of punishment or retribution. Indeed, civilization invented this
when it invented the state. "Mere civilization," observed Kenneth Boulding, "the kind
of society that stretches from ancient Sumer to, shall we say, Amin's Uganda-is not
good enough. Its achievements, great as they are, have been paid for at a very high
cost in human degradation, suffering, inequality, and dominance."9 Populations are,
therefore, conditioned to some fear; they become concemed when they fmd themselves
particularly vulnerable.
Terrorism, however, exploits this fear in a particular way. It discredits
confidence in customary sources of protection and safety-such as customary social
reciprocities, the police, and so on. It maintains an inescapable and continuous state of
fear and apprehension. Most important to this discussion, however, it threatens
physical and psychological violence against oneself, or those with whom one
especially identifies. It is this last-the threat to the self, to self-identity-that is
especialIy important. Threatening the self-identity of an entire segment of the
popuIation is an immensely powerful insttument of psychological control.
Thus, while terrorism depends on discrediting much cognitive material, it also
specifically accentuates the cognitive distinction between self and other.10 That is,
who is threatened versus who does the threatening. Thus, it place s special emphasis
on separate identities. In society, the solidarities most commonly created by identity
systems are ethnicities.
B. Violence against Individuals and Social Groups
The present inquiry is concemed with the reproduction of terrorist violence, a
somewhat special case within the much larger range of state terrorism that is current in
7
today's world. To clarify the circumstances that help explain this, we need to
differentiate some other cases.
First concerns the targeted abuse of single individuals, often with the
immediate purpose of eliminating the individual while indirectIy warning others with
political ambitions. The last three decades' killing of Guatemalan and El Salvadoran
political figures illustrates the process. It is notable that, except for the Somozas'
Nicaragua, such events have been rare in southeast Central America. It is, however,
not unexpected in Mexico, another Mesoamerican country. This kind of killing is
sponsored by a regime, and while it may show preference for killing people of
particular ethnicities, it is likely to range more widely.
This kind of violence may precede the emergence of state terrorism practiced
on a mass basis. This is usually rationalized by labeling a cognitive category as being
so dangerous to the welfare of the state that its members must be eliminated. By far
the most convenient and best known in Central America today is "Cornmunist." The
membership of such categories can be easily expanded from the identified individual s
to include their associates, relatives, or people with any other perceived connection, be
it ever so random and insubstantial. The outstanding case here was Argentina, where
not only political figures, but farnily members and defense lawyers associated with
them were additional targets.
The category of "Indio" is older and more fundamental than is "Cornmunist,"
but the relative role of the two categories in the killing process may be somewhat
misunderstood. The "Indio" category elicited slaughter long before the Communist
label appeared, and it has effectively divided and inhibited the development of national
identity in Mesoamerican countries since the conquest. Since the Russian revolution,
however, the term "Communist" has been increasingly used as a way to give an
international poli tical rationale for the killing of Indians. Thus, rulers of El Salvador
and Guatemala claim that they are intent on exterminating "Cornmunism" when they
set forth to kill indigenous and rural people.
C. Reproduction of State Terrorism
Most cases of state terrorism are classically characteristic of single regimes,
and not of a continuing society as a whole. The regime of any state may indulge in
state terrorist action under certain circumstances. One can readily cite Germany and
Italy under the 1930 regimes; Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina in the 1970s; Chile
under Pinochet; Paraguay under Stroessner; Santo Domingo under Trujillo; Nicaragua
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under Somoza; and so on. It has been argued, drawing on O'Donnell's bureaucratic-
authoritarian model, that such regimes are inherently repressive,11 that their "political
culture" predisposes them to resort to terrorismo
There is little question that these regimes resorted to political terrorismo But to
characterize them as having a terrorist "political culture" predisposed to initiate the
violence hardly clarifies anything. Culture is an adaptive process; people readily
invent, borrow, and cast it off depending on how useful they believe it will be. If a
regime does resort to violence, one might argue that it has such a political culture. But
if one were to charge that the society at large had such a culture means that it would
appear in previous and subsequent regimes. One cannot make this argument for these
countries. For terrorist violence to be inherent in a culture-political or otherwise-it
must exist as an operative part of existing societal relationships and among all parties
to those relationships. It is patently difficult to argue that Chile, Argentina, Uruguay,
or Brazil had political cultures of terrorism before the violence began in the 1960s and
1970. While such violence might reappear, in imitation of earlier regimes, there is
little evidence that it has been embedded in a political culture in these societies.12 Nor
is it clear what mechanisms would make it easily reproduce itself.
4. Conquest and Ethnicity in State Terrorism
A. The Conquest Relationship
Having argued that some c1assic cases of state terrorism are not embedded in a
political culture, and hence cannot be expected readily 10reproduce state terrorism, 1
will now argue that in the case of Guatemala and El Salvador there is a mechanism,
although probably not inherent in a "political culture," that has succeeded in leading
state terrorism to reproduce itself. The mechanism derives from the Spanish military
conquest that imposed ethnic division, creating a relationship that has regenerated the
potential for killing in the colonial and republican generations ever since.
The relationship created by military conquest in Mesoamerica bears some
examination. First, a military conquest creates a sharp contrast between the identities
of the conqueror and the conquered. The victor's self-image involves extraordinary
superiority, and sees the conquered as one who can only be securely controlled by
violence and whose failure to conform is treasonous, and hence merits violence.
There is nec"essity to use the violence that was used during the conquest. It is by no
means the rational decision that it may appear to be, but rather an irrational assumption
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that such violence is the "only way" to deal with the issues. Moreover, the periodic
recourse to violence reinforces these usually unspoken assumptions.
Second, the conquered reject the implied inferiority of being, but recognize the
de facto inferiority of status created by the conquest Therefore, the conquered have to
recognize that their native rights and abilities are frustrated if not actually violentIy
repressed. Great care must be taken in dealing with the conqueror so long as the
violent conquest relationship remains operative. This is, however, often impossible,
and the subordinated peoples become threatening to the rulers. This is sometimes
unintentional, but it is more often intentional, such as were the revolts in El Salvador
in 1932 and in Guatemala in 1979-1984. The conquest relationship then elicits violence
and slaughter from the descendants of the conquerors.
We are therefore proposing that in Guatemala and El Salvador state terrorism is
derived from, and bound to, two related historical conditions: (1) The conquest of one
society by another; and (2) the continuing separate social reproduction of the
conquerors and the conquered. Moreover, the psychology of social relations that was
created and active in the original conquest continues to be reproduced and to operate in
the relations that hold within the conquest state.
B. The Reproduction of Ethnic Identity
The separate ethnic identities at stake here were created by the sixteenth-
century conquest. When the conquerors arrived they were not Spaniards; rather, they
were Castillians, Leonese, Asturianos, Galacianos, and so on. They gave the label
"Indio" to a whole series of separate indigenous ethnicities. The conquerors only took
on a common label later, choosing "Castillano" to label the shared identity that
emerged in the face of conquered peoples, of imported slaves, and as a growing
mestizo population challenged their identity.
To the members of an ethnicity, the reproduction of this identity is critical. The
contemporary Guatemalan indigene is just as concerned for the continuation of his or
her ethnic identity as is the ladino. Their very separateness makes it all the easier to be
c1ear as to who stands on which side of the conquest relationship.
The self-identity of these ethnicities, however, does not, and need not,
conform to the view from the outside. What the ruling ladinos of the state choose to
inc1ude as being equivalent to "Indio" may well inc1ude a wide range of rural country
people. Forsome rural indigenes, urban, university-educated indigenes may appear
and act like ladinos. In El Salvador today there are many urbanites who doubt that
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there are many indigenous people in the country at all. They see only rural country
people. There is, however, a sizable population that so identify themselves, many of
whom speak the Nahuatl language, and who are aware of what they regard as a
systematic tendency ofthe ladino-run state military to do them violence.13 They, and
their much more numerous Guatemalan brothers and sisters, know who was there
before the conquest, and are jealous and bitter conceming their role in the
contemporary world.
5. Conclusions
In Guatemala and El Salvador regime-sponsored state terrorism keeps the
conquest-based relationship between the major ethnicities alive and virulent. The fear
and often hatred that is ensconced within the relationship between the two populations
is usually, as in many civilized societies, hidden behind pattems of interaction in
which rural indigenes feign humility and ladinos assume patronizing and superior
attitudes. It is founded in systematic differences in control over land and resources,
and in a system of laws that inhibit any easy solution for the indigenous people, as an
ethnic sector, to change materially their collective poverty.
The Guatemalan and Salvadoran states confront somewhat different problems
since the latter hardly know who comprise the indigenous population. In Guatemala,
however, the,indigenous presence is pervasively visible and increasingly audible. The
Revolution of 1944, the benefits of which were suppressed and lost, coupled with a
political awareness14 that raged like a ftre through the westem highlands between 1976
and 1984, have created a new indigenous awareness. It is one that is much less willing
to humbly retreat, much more willing to confront the state apparatus directly, and
much more willing to think of slaughter not merely as something that indigenes have 10
suffer.
Regime terrorism has, until now, been one of the principal instruments of the
periodic regeneration of the conquest relationship between the major ethnicities in
Guatemala and El Salvador, reinforcing the ethnic differences and fostering terrorism
within the society at large. By the same token, the ladinos' identity system has
depended on this terrorism for the security needed by a conqueror of an indigenous
people who refuse to accept that they have been conquered.
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Thus, fear generated by ethnic differences reinforces the tendency of an
ethnocratic state to reson to terrorism when dealing with the subordinate indigenous
population. When the slaughter is launched, the fear itself is augmented within the
societal relations, thus making more likely the possibility that it will, in tum, trigger
funher state terrorismo
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